



From NewHope to Kyber

Peter Schwabe

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
<https://cryptojedi.org>

February 23, 2017



"In the past, people have said, maybe it's 50 years away, it's a dream, maybe it'll happen sometime. I used to think it was 50. Now I'm thinking like it's 15 or a little more. It's within reach. It's within our lifetime. It's going to happen."

—Mark Ketchen (IBM), Feb. 2012, about quantum computers



Shor's algorithm (1994)

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- Compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time
- Complete break of RSA, ElGamal, DSA, Diffie-Hellman
- Complete break of elliptic-curve variants (ECDSA, ECDH, ...)




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Forward-secure post-quantum crypto

- Threatening *today*:
 - Attacker records encrypted messages now
 - Uses quantum computer in 1-2 decades to break encryption




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 - Countermeasure against key compromise
 - Not a countermeasure against cryptographic break




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- Consequence: **Want post-quantum PFS crypto today**



Ring-Learning-with-errors (RLWE)

- Let $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$
- Let χ be an *error distribution* on \mathcal{R}_q
- Let $\mathbf{s} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ be secret
- Attacker is given pairs $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{as} + \mathbf{e})$ with
 - \mathbf{a} uniformly random from \mathcal{R}_q
 - \mathbf{e} sampled from χ
- Task for the attacker: find \mathbf{s}



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 - \mathbf{a} uniformly random from \mathcal{R}_q
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- Task for the attacker: find \mathbf{s}
- Common choice for χ : discrete Gaussian
- Common optimization for protocols: fix \mathbf{a}



Alice (server)		Bob (client)
$\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e} \xleftarrow{s} \chi$		$\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{e}' \xleftarrow{s'} \chi$
$\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathbf{a}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$	$\xrightarrow{\mathbf{b}}$	$\mathbf{u} \leftarrow \mathbf{a}\mathbf{s}' + \mathbf{e}'$
	$\xleftarrow{\mathbf{u}}$	

Alice has $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{u}\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{a}\mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}' + \mathbf{e}'\mathbf{s}$

Bob has $\mathbf{t}' = \mathbf{b}\mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{a}\mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}' + \mathbf{e}\mathbf{s}'$

- Secret and noise polynomials $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{s}', \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}'$ are small
- \mathbf{t} and \mathbf{t}' are *approximately* the same



POST-QUANTUM KEY EXCHANGE



A NEW HOPE

ERDEM ALKIM

LÉO DUCAS


THOMAS PÖPPELMANN

PETER SCHWABE


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- Use reconciliation to go from approximate agreement to agreement
 - Originally proposed by Ding (2012)
 - Improvements by Peikert (2014)
 - More improvements in NewHope




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
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- Very conservative parameters ($n = 1024, q = 12289$)
- Centered binomial noise ψ_k ($\text{HW}(a) - \text{HW}(b)$ for k -bit a, b)
- Achieve ≈ 256 bits of post-quantum security according to very conservative analysis
- Higher security, shorter messages, and $> 10\times$ speedup




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
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
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- Multiple implementations




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
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- November 28, 2016: *“At this point the experiment is concluded.”*



"[...] we did not find any unexpected impediment to deploying something like NewHope. There were no reported problems caused by enabling it."



"[...] if the need arose, it would be practical to quickly deploy NewHope in TLS 1.2. (TLS 1.3 makes things a little more complex and we did not test with CECPQ1 with it.)"



“Although the median connection latency only increased by a millisecond, the latency for the slowest 5% increased by 20ms and, for the slowest 1%, by 150ms. Since NewHope is computationally inexpensive, we’re assuming that this is caused entirely by the increased message sizes. Since connection latencies compound on the web (because subresource discovery is delayed), the data requirement of NewHope is moderately expensive for people on slower connections.”

Are we done? Is the Internet safe again?



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


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Back to the drawing board!





THE KEM

Shi Bai

Eike Kiltz

John M. Schanck

Joppe Bos

Tancredè Lepoint

Peter Schwabe

Léo Ducas

Vadim Lyubashevsky

Damien Stehlé

The design of Kyber (WiP)

- Use **Module-Lattices** and MLWE
 - RLWE: large polynomials (e.g., $n = 1024$)
 - LWE: matrices of integers with large dimension (e.g., 752×752 , 752×8)
 - MLWE: matrices of smaller polynomials (e.g., $n = 256$) of small dimension (e.g., 3×3 , 3×1)
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 - Possibility for further compression of keys and ciphertext (WiP)

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- Messages in “standard” format
 - No dependency on particular multiplication algorithm
 - Possibility for further compression of keys and ciphertext (WiP)
- Easy to scale security by changing d

Kyber's encryption scheme

$$q = 7681, n = 256, d = 3$$

We work with matrices of polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_{7681}[x]/(x^{256} + 1)$ of dim. $d = 3$ and a distribution of poly with binomial coeffs. Ψ_4

KeyGen():

- $\text{seed} \leftarrow \{0, \dots, 255\}^{32}$
- $\mathbf{A} = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & a_{13} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & a_{23} \\ a_{31} & a_{32} & a_{33} \end{pmatrix} \leftarrow \text{SHAKE}(\text{seed})$
- $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \Psi_4^d$
- $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$
- Define $\text{pk} = (\text{seed}, \mathbf{b})$ and $\text{sk} = \mathbf{s}$



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Encrypt(pk, $m \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$, coins):

- seed, $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \text{pk}$
- $\mathbf{A} = \text{SHAKE}(\text{seed})$
- $\mathbf{s}' \leftarrow \Psi_4^d(\text{coins}, 1)$
- $\mathbf{e}' \leftarrow \Psi_4^d(\text{coins}, 2)$
- $\mathbf{e}'' \leftarrow \Psi_4(\text{coins}, 3)$
- $\mathbf{u} = (\mathbf{s}')^t \cdot \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{e}'$
- $\mathbf{v} = \langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{s}' \rangle + \mathbf{e}'' + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor \cdot \sum_i m_i x^i$
- Output (\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v})

Decrypt(sk, (\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v})):

- $w = \mathbf{v} - \langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{s} \rangle$
- for $i \in \{0, \dots, 255\}$,
$$m_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } w_i \in (\frac{q}{4}, \frac{3 \cdot q}{4}) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
- Output (m_0, \dots, m_{255})

Idea of the CCA transformation

Alice (Server)	Bob (Client)
<u>Gen()</u> : $pk, sk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$ $seed, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow pk$	<u>Enc(seed, \mathbf{b}):</u> $x \leftarrow \{0, \dots, 255\}^{32}$ $x \leftarrow \text{SHA3-256}(x)$ $k, \text{coins} \leftarrow \text{SHA3-512}(x)$ $\mathbf{u}, v \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}((seed, \mathbf{b}), x, \text{coins})$
<u>Dec($\mathbf{s}, (\mathbf{u}, v)$):</u> $x' \leftarrow \text{Decrypt}(\mathbf{s}, (\mathbf{u}, v))$ $k', \text{coins}' \leftarrow \text{SHA3-512}(x')$ $\mathbf{u}', v' \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}((seed, \mathbf{b}), x', \text{coins}')$ verify if $(\mathbf{u}', v') = (\mathbf{u}, v)$	

Additionally:

- Hash the public key into the coins
- Hash the ciphertext into the final key

	NewHope	Kyber
public-key bytes	1824	1088
ciphertext bytes	2048	1152
Gen cycles	258 246	296 544
Enc cycles	384 994	401 960
Dec cycles	86 280	469 872

- Cycles are for C reference implementation on Haswell
- Optimized implementations for Kyber will follow



<http://pq-crystals.org/kyber>

