Operating Systems Security – Assignment 2

2017/2018 Due Date: 30 Nov 2017 (23:59 CET)

1 Compile and load your own Linux kernel module

Login to your (Kali) Linux system as a root user and compile the program cr4.c:

```
#include <stdio.h>
void main() {
    unsigned long long result;
    /*unsigned long result; (for 32-bit OS)*/
    __asm__("movq %%cr4, %%rax\n" : "=a"(result));
    /*__asm__("mov %%cr4, %%eax\n" : "=a"(result)); (for 32-bit OS)*/
    printf("Value of CR4 = %llx\n", result);
}
```

with the command line:
gcc -o cr4 cr4.c

Notice that executing will result in an exception: # ./cr4 Segmentation fault

Using a debugger, we can quickly pinpoint what the problem is. Start debugger in assembly mode **# gdb -ex "layout asm" ./cr4** and execute it using the following **GDB** instruction **# run**

Objectives

- a) Figure out where the register **CR4** is used for and report back why you think it should not be accessible in user mode¹.
- b) Figure out which exact assembly instruction of **cr4.c** triggers the segmentation fault and briefly write down what it tries to do.
- c) Follow the "How to Write Your Own Linux Kernel Module with a Simple Example" guide hosted at this website² and try to reproduce their results. You should be able to see your kernel module output with the following command:
 \$ dmesg | tail -10
- d) If your kernel module is working correctly, try to adjust the kernel module to read out the exact same CR4 register. Hand in the source-code of your kernel module together with a Makefile to build it and report back which value the CR4 in your (Kali) Linux system has.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_register

² http://www.thegeekstuff.com/2013/07/write-linux-kernel-module/

2 Return to libc

The standard mechanism to circumvent a non-executable stack in a buffer-overflow attack is to use return-oriented programming. This exercise is a classical return-to-libc attack on the AMD64 architecture.

Prerequisites

We will (at first) make our life easy and attack a textbook vulnerable program, which additionally prints the address of a buffer:

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
    char name[256];
    printf("%p\n",&name);
    puts("What's your name?");
    gets(name);
    printf("Hello, %s!\n", name);
    return 0;
}
```

Let us assume that this program is running with suid-root; the target of the attacker is to use a buffer overflow of the name buffer to obtain a root shell.

The idea of the attack is the following: make sure that the code eventually returns into the system function of libc with a pointer to the string "/bin/sh" in register rdi. This assumes that the attack is running on a 64-bit Linux system (AMD64 architecture); on this architecture, the first argument of a function is passed through register rdi. The attack needs the following building blocks:

- Put the string "/bin/sh" somewhere into the address space of the program, e.g., into the buffer name;
- find a gadget that consists of the instruction pop $\$ rdi followed by retq;
- overwrite the return address of the function with the address of this gadget;
- write behind this gadget the address of the string "/bin/sh" (this is what is going to be popped into rdi);
- write behind the address of the string the address of system in libc. This is what is finally going to be called, giving you the root shell.
- (optionally) write behind this address the address of exit in libc. This will avoid the segmentation fault.

An excellent walkthrough of this attack is given by Ben Lynn on http://crypto.stanford.edu/~blynn/rop/.

Remark 1: Some parts of the assignment may depend on various aspects of your Linux system (in particular, the version of libc). If you have trouble with some parts, then try on lilo.science.ru.nl (where it has been tested). Obviously on this machine you cannot run the program suid-root, but you can still get a (non-root) shell and confirm that the attack works.

Remark 2: Note that in our exercise the size of the buffer changed; take this into account when mounting the attack.

Remark 3: It is important to compile the program with gcc flag -fno-stack-protector. **Remark 4:** It is important to disable ASLR (either by using setarch 'arch' -R as in Lynn's tutorial for each call or by running echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space once as root).

Remark 5: Tip: try to make your attack execute /bin/ls first. If that works, change it to /bin/sh.

2.1 Objectives

- a) Run the attack and obtain a root shell (you might want to try first without suid-root to not allow too much disaster if things go wrong). Now automate this attack in a bash script. The bash script should be robust, i.e., it should handle the case that offsets in libc are different. You can test this by running the script on a different machine, e.g., on lilo.science.ru.nl. Submit this script.
- b) The attack does not work against the "original" version of the program in Lynn's tutorial with a buffer size of 64. Use gdb to find out why not In particular, answer the following questions:
 - Does the attacked program jump (return) to the pop %rdi, retq gadget? If not, why not?
 - Does the attacked program put the right address into rdi? If not, why not?
 - Does the attacked program jump (return) to system? If not, why not?
 - Does the attacked program issue the correct syscall? If so, which one? If not, why not?
 - Summarize and explain why the attack does not work.

Note: It is of course perfectly fine to compile the program with the -g flag).

Note: Addresses (for example, of name) are probably slightly different when running the program in gdb.

- c) Can you think about a way to make the attack work with a buffer of size 64? Hint: Where else can you find the string /bin/sh or similar?
- d) Bonus task: Make the attack work against a buffer of size 64 and against a buffer of size 4.