Engineering Cryptographic Software Scalar multiplication

Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands




Winter 2022

"Today I will be your substitute teacher"

Amber Sprenkels

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The ECC pyramid



The top of the pyramid

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 - Correctness.
 - ► Security, and
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- Setting for this lecture (peak of the pyramid):
 - Consider (finite, abelian) group G, written additively
 - ightharpoonup Compute $k \cdot P$ for $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $P \in G$
 - ightharpoonup This is the same as x^k for x in a multiplicative group G'
 - ▶ Same algorithms for scalar multiplication and exponentiation

ECC in one minute

- ▶ (Peter will explain this in more depth in the coming weeks)
- ightharpoonup The are points P, Q, \dots
- ▶ All the points on an elliptic curve form a group
 - ▶ You can add/subtract points together, i.e. R := P + Q where $P \neq Q$, or
 - ▶ You can double points, i.e. R := [2]P
 - ▶ This is done using two formulas resp. (called addition formulas)
 - ▶ There is a *neutral element* \mathcal{O} (like the number 0), i.e. $P + \mathcal{O} = P$
- lacktriangle You cannot multiply a point with another point, i.e., $P\cdot Q$ is invalid
- ▶ You can multiply a point with a scalar, i.e., kP (or [k]P)

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- Scalar arithmetic is faster than point arithmetic
- ► More concretely: point addition uses roughly 10 50 field operations

The ECDLP

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- ► Typical setting for cryptosystems:
 - P is a fixed system parameter,
 - k is the secret (private) key,
 - Q is the public key.
- \blacktriangleright Key generation needs to compute Q=kP, given k and P

EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange

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- ▶ Alice computes joint key as $K = k_A Q_B$
- ▶ Bob computes joint key as $K = k_B Q_A$

Schnorr signatures

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$$R = rP$$

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 $lackbox{ Verify: compute } \overline{R} = SP + H(R,M)Q_A \text{ and check that }$

$$H(\overline{R}, M) \stackrel{?}{=} H(R, M)$$

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 - ► The scalars in Schnorr signature verification are public
- ▶ In the following: Distinguish these cases

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- ► Conclusion: we need algorithms that run in polynomial time (in the size of the scalar)

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- ▶ $105 = ((((((((((((((((1 \cdot 2 + 1) \cdot 2) + 0) \cdot 2) + 1) \cdot 2) + 0) \cdot 2) + 0) \cdot 2) + 1)$ (Horner's rule)
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► Cost: 6 doublings, 3 additions
► General algorithm: "Double and add"
    R \leftarrow P
    for i \leftarrow n-2 downto 0 do
       R \leftarrow 2R
       if (k)_{2}[i] = 1 then
          R \leftarrow R + P
       end if
    end for
    return R
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- Running time clearly depends on the scalar: insecure for secret scalars!

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 - ▶ Compute k_1P_1 ($n_1 1$ doublings, $m_1 1$ additions)
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- \blacktriangleright We can do better ($\mathcal O$ denotes the neutral element):

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\begin{aligned} R &\leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ \text{for } i &\leftarrow \max(n_1, n_2) - 1 \text{ downto } 0 \text{ do} \\ R &\leftarrow 2R \\ \text{if } (k_1)_2[i] &= 1 \text{ then} \\ R &\leftarrow R + P_1 \\ \text{end if} \\ \text{if } (k_2)_2[i] &= 1 \text{ then} \\ R &\leftarrow R + P_2 \\ \text{end if} \\ \text{end for} \\ \text{return } R \end{aligned}
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- ▶ Let's just precompute $T = P_1 + P_2$
- Modified algorithm (special case of Strauss' algorithm):

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for i \leftarrow \max(n_1, n_2) - 1 downto 0 do
    R \leftarrow 2R
    if (k_1)_2[i] = 1 AND (k_2)_2[i] = 1 then
         R \leftarrow R + T
    else if (k_1)_2[i] = 1 then
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- \blacktriangleright How about, for example, precompute $P, 2P, 4P, 8P, \dots, 2^{n-1}P$
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► Eliminated all doublings in fixed-basepoint scalar multiplication!

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Still not constant time, more later...

Let's rewrite that a bit . . .

- \blacktriangleright We have a table $T = (\mathcal{O}, P)$
- ▶ Notation $T[0] = \mathcal{O}$, T[1] = P
- Scalar multiplication is

$$\begin{aligned} R &\leftarrow P \\ \mathbf{for} \ i \leftarrow n-2 \ \mathsf{downto} \ 0 \ \mathbf{do} \\ R &\leftarrow 2R \\ R &\leftarrow R + T[(k)_2[i]] \end{aligned}$$
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 for $i \leftarrow n-2$ downto 0 do $R \leftarrow 3R$ $R \leftarrow R + T[(k)_3[i]]$ end for

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- ▶ How about some nice numbers, like 4, 8, 16?

Fixed-window scalar multiplication

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```
\begin{split} R \leftarrow T[(k)_{2^w}[m-1]] \\ \textbf{for } i \leftarrow m-2 \text{ downto } 0 \textbf{ do} \\ \textbf{for } j \leftarrow 1 \text{ to } w \textbf{ do} \\ R \leftarrow 2R \\ \textbf{end for} \\ R \leftarrow R + T[(k)_{2^w}[i]] \\ \textbf{end for} \end{split}
```

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- ► Larger w: More precomputation
- ► Smaller w: More additions inside the loop
- For ≈ 256 -bit scalars choose w=4 or w=5

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 - ▶ Remember that table lookups are generally not constant time!

Making it constant time

```
/* Sets r to the neutral element on the elliptic curve */
extern ec_point_setneutral(ec_point *r);
/* Adds p and q and stores the result in r */
extern ec_point_add(ec_point *r, const ec_point *p, const ec_point *q);
/* Doubles p and stores the result in r */
extern ec_point_double(ec_point *r, const ec_point *p);
/* For point P contains pre-computed multiples P, 2*P, 3*P,...,255*P */
extern ec_point precomputed[255];
ec_scalarmult_P(unsigned char scalar[32])
  int i.i:
 ec_point r;
  ec_setneutral(&r);
  for(i=31;i>=0;i--)
    for(j=0;j<8;j++)
      ec_point_double(&r,&r);
    if(scalar[i] != 0)
      ec_point_add(&r,&r,precomputed[scalar[i]-1]);
 }
```

Making it constant time

```
/* Sets r to the neutral element on the elliptic curve */
extern ec point setneutral(ec point *r):
/* Adds p and q and stores the result in r */
extern ec_point_add(ec_point *r, const ec_point *p, const ec_point *q);
/* Doubles p and stores the result in r */
extern ec_point_double(ec_point *r, const ec_point *p);
/* For point P contains pre-computed multiples 0, P, 2*P, 3*P....,255*P */
extern ec point precomputed[256]:
ec_scalarmult_P(unsigned char scalar[32])
 int i.i:
 ec_point r;
  ec_setneutral(&r);
 for(i=31;i>=0;i--)
   for(i=0:i<8:i++)
     ec_point_double(&r,&r);
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}
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ec_scalarmult_P(unsigned char scalar[32])
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 ec_point r,t;
  ec_setneutral(&r);
  for(i=31;i>=0:i--)
   for(j=0;j<8;j++)
      ec_point_double(&r,&r);
    ec_point_lookup(&t,precomputed,scalar[i]);
    ec_point_add(&r,&r,&t);
```

ec_point_lookup

```
static void ec_point_lookup(ec_point *t, const ec_point *table, int pos)
{
  int i,j;
  unsigned char b;
  *t = table[0];
  for(i=0;i<256;i++)
  {
    b = (i == pos); // Not constant time!
    ec_point_cmov(t, table[i], b); // Copy table[i] to t if b is 1
  }
}</pre>
```

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static void ec_point_lookup(ec_point *t, const ec_point *table, int pos)
{
  int i,j;
  unsigned char b;
  *t = table[0];
  for(i=0;i<256;i++)
  {
    b = int_eq(i, pos); // set b=1 if i==pos, else set b=0
    ec_point_cmov(t, table[i], b); // Copy table[i] to t if b is 1
  }
}</pre>
```

int_eq and ec_point_cmov

```
unsigned char int_eq(int a, int b)
 unsigned long long t = a ^ b;
 t = (-t) >> 63;
 return 1-t;
void ec_point_cmov(ec_point *r, const ec_point *t, unsigned char b)
 unsigned char *u = (unsigned char *)r;
 unsigned char *v = (unsigned char *)t;
 int i;
 b = -b:
 for(i=0;i<sizeof(ec_point);i++)</pre>
   u[i] = (b \& v[i]) ^ (b \& u[i]);
```

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- Precompute $T_i = (\mathcal{O}, P, 2P, 3P, \dots, (2^w 1)P) \cdot 2^i$ for $i = 0, w, 2w, 3w, \lceil n/w \rceil 1$

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- Perform scalar multiplication as

$$R \leftarrow T_0[(k)_{2^w}[0]]$$
 for $i \leftarrow 1$ to $\lceil n/w \rceil - 1$ do $R \leftarrow R + T_{iw}[(k)_{2^w}[i]]$ end for

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- ▶ No doublings, only $\lceil n/w \rceil 1$ additions
- ightharpoonup Can use huge w, but:
 - at some point the precomputed tables don't fit into cache anymore.
 - constant-time loads get slow for large w

- ► Consider the scalar $22 = (10110)_2$ and window size 2
 - ightharpoonup Initialize R with P
 - ightharpoonup Double, double, add P
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- Problem with fixed window: it's fixed.
- ► Idea: "slide" the window over the scalar

- Choose window size w
- Rewrite scalar k as $k=(k_0,\ldots,k_m)$ with k_i in $\{0,1,3,5,\ldots,2^w-1\}$ with at most one non-zero entry in each window of length w

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- ▶ Do this by scanning k from right to left, expand window from each 1-bit
- ightharpoonup Precompute $P, 3P, 5P, \dots, (2^w 1)P$
- Perform scalar multiplication

```
\begin{array}{c} R \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \\ \textbf{for} \ i \leftarrow m \ \textbf{to} \ 0 \ \textbf{do} \\ R \leftarrow 2R \\ \textbf{if} \ k_i \neq 0 \ \textbf{then} \\ R \leftarrow R + k_i P \\ \textbf{end} \ \textbf{if} \\ \textbf{end for} \end{array}
```

Analysis of sliding window

- ▶ We still do n-1 doublings for an n-bit scalar
- ▶ Precomputation needs $2^{w-1} 1$ additions
- ightharpoonup Expected number of additions in the main loop: n/(w+1)

Analysis of sliding window

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- ightharpoonup For the same w fewer additions in the main loop
- ▶ But: It's not running in constant time!
- ▶ Still nice (in double-scalar version) for signature verification

- ► Consider elliptic curves of the form $By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$.
- ▶ Montgomery in 1987 showed how to perform *x*-coordinate-based arithmetic:
 - ightharpoonup Given the x-coordinate x_P of P, and
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 - ▶ given the *x*-coordinate x_{P-Q} of P-Q

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- ► This is called differential addition
- Less efficient differential-addition formulas for other curve shapes
- ► Can be used for efficient computation of the *x*-coordinate of *kP* given only the *x*-coordinate of *P*
- lacktriangle For this, let's use projective representation (X:Z) with x=(X/Z)

One Montgomery "ladder step"

```
const a24 = (A+2)/4 (A from the curve equation)
function ladderstep(X_{Q-P}, X_P, Z_P, X_Q, Z_Q)
     t_1 \leftarrow X_P + Z_P
     t_6 \leftarrow t_1^2
     t_2 \leftarrow X_P - Z_P
     t_7 \leftarrow t_2^2
     t_5 \leftarrow t_6 - t_7
     t_3 \leftarrow X_O + Z_O
     t_4 \leftarrow X_0 - Z_0
     t_8 \leftarrow t_4 \cdot t_1
     t_0 \leftarrow t_3 \cdot t_2
     X_{P+Q} \leftarrow (t_8 + t_0)^2
     Z_{P+Q} \leftarrow X_{Q-P} \cdot (t_8 - t_9)^2
     X_{2P} \leftarrow t_6 \cdot t_7
     Z_{2P} \leftarrow t_5 \cdot (t_7 + a24 \cdot t_5)
     return (X_{2P}, Z_{2P}, X_{P+Q}, Z_{P+Q})
end function
```

The Montgomery ladder

```
Require: A scalar 0 \leq k \in \mathbb{Z} and the x-coordinate x_P of some point P Ensure: (X_{kP}, Z_{kP}) fulfilling x_{kP} = X_{kP}/Z_{kP} X_1 = x_P; \ X_2 = 1; \ Z_2 = 0; \ X_3 = x_P; \ Z_3 = 1 for i \leftarrow n-1 downto 0 do if bit i of k is 1 then  (X3, Z3, X2, Z2) \leftarrow \mathsf{ladderstep}(X1, X3, Z3, X2, Z2)  else  (X2, Z2, X3, Z3) \leftarrow \mathsf{ladderstep}(X1, X2, Z2, X3, Z3)  end if end for return X_2/Z_2
```

The Montgomery ladder (ctd.)

```
Require: A scalar 0 \le k \in \mathbb{Z} and the x-coordinate x_P of some point P
Ensure: (X_{kP}, Z_{kP}) fulfilling x_{kP} = X_{kP}/Z_{kP}
   X_1 = x_P; X_2 = 1; Z_2 = 0; X_3 = x_P; Z_3 = 1
   for i \leftarrow n-1 downto 0 do
       b \leftarrow \mathsf{bit}\ i \ \mathsf{of}\ s
       c \leftarrow b \oplus p
       p \leftarrow b
       (X2, X3) \leftarrow \mathsf{cswap}(X2, X3, c)
       (Z2,Z3) \leftarrow \mathsf{cswap}(Z2,Z3,c)
        (X2, Z2, X3, Z3) \leftarrow \mathsf{ladderstep}(X1, X2, Z2, X3, Z3)
   end for
   return X_2/Z_2
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- Very fast (at least if we don't compare to curves with efficient endomorphisms)
- ► Point compression/decompression is free
- ► Easy to implement
- ▶ No ugly special cases (see Bernstein's "Curve25519" paper)

- ► Consider computation $Q = \sum_{i=1}^{n} k_i P_i$
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- ▶ Use that $k_1P_1 + k_2P_2 = (k_1 k_2)P_1 + k_2(P_1 + P_2)$
- ► Replace:
 - \blacktriangleright (k_1P_1) and (k_2P_2) , with
 - $(k_1-k_2)P_1$ and $k_2(P_1+P_2)$
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- ▶ Each step "eliminates" expected $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$ scalar bits
- Can be very fast (but not constant-time)
- Requires fast access to the two largest scalars: put scalars into a heap
- Crucial for good performance: fast heap implementation

A fast heap

- Heap is a binary tree, each parent node is larger than the two child nodes
- ▶ Data structure is stored as a simple array, positions in the array determine positions in the tree
- ▶ Root is at position 0, left child node at position 1, right child node at position 2 etc.
- For node at position i, child nodes are at position $2 \cdot i + 1$ and $2 \cdot i + 2$, parent node is at position $\lfloor (i-1)/2 \rfloor$

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- Typical heap root replacement (pop operation): start at the root, swap down for a variable amount of times
- ► Floyd's heap: swap down to the bottom, swap up for a variable amount of times, advantages:
 - Each swap-down step needs only one comparison (instead of two)
 - Swap-down loop is more friendly to branch predictors

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- Not the typical setting for ECC
- ► Some applications:
 - ► Inversion in finite fields (cmp. slides 55&56 of multiprecision.pdf)
 - ► Elliptic-curve factorization method (not in this lecture)

Definition

- $ightharpoonup s_1 = 1$
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- Signed-scalar representations are "addition-subtraction chains"
- ► For fixed scalar we can spend a lot of time to find a good addition chain at compile time
- ▶ This is what will be used for inversion in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$
- Computing good addition chains? See github.com/mmcloughlin/addchain